Foreign policy and the DR’s national interest in Latin America PART 1 of 5

The Western Hemisphere is currently witnessing an era of political, economic and social instability. The continuing reduction of influence of Latin America in world affairs and the decline of international resources and investment for development is the result of the region’s instability. The global economy’s center of gravity is shifting towards Asia. As international sources for investment become increasingly scarce, the competition for the remaining sources of investment in Latin America will become increasingly intense. Within this strategic reality, Latin America is undergoing the initial stages of the fractionalization of the region into competing political and economic blocs. This era is of historical importance for the Dominican Republic. It must conduct an assertive foreign policy based on its national interests to retain its freedom of action and to maintain its sovereignty. Its inability to do so will reduce an already strategically weak Dominican Republic to unilaterally maintain its stability and security in a destabilizing region or to become a de facto neutral state subject to the influence of the powers of the region. Either of these unfortunate outcomes will result in the Dominican Republic unable to fulfill its duty to control its destiny. In this context, in the present crisis in the regional order, the Dominican Republic must emerge as a northern Caribbean power to guarantee its ability to pursue its national interests.

In the regional strategic aspect, the region is undergoing a shift in the distribution of power. Brazil harbors desires to become the preeminent South American power, however, with these ambitions; it lays the seeds for the undermining of MERCOSUR. MERCOSUR, originally an instrument designed to restrain the historic Argentine-Brazilian rivalry for South American preponderance by establishing areas of common interests, has become, through the economic exhaustion of Argentina, an instrument for Brazilian regional preeminence and global ambitions. Brazilian foreign policy reflects this assessment; it has been unwilling to devolve its sovereignty and freedom of action as required to increase MERCOSUR’s institutionalization required as per its unofficial template, the EU. Ironically, for a political and economic arrangement, MERCOSUR has failed to create consistent common domestic policies, but has allowed the agreement’s powers to create a common vision of foreign policy based on the desire to restrain the United States to enable the fulfillment of their regional and global ambitions. It has failed to economically and politically stabilize the South American region; all four members have experienced and are still prone to economic destabilization and in doing so have spread their economic difficulties to each other, which have triggered unilateral actions by the other member states. The emergence within the member states of leaders who aspire to maintain MERCOSUR, but also express desires to increase the state’s involvement in economic development creates a contradictory situation in which the fundamental requirements of free trade of common markets and common regulations are subordinated to political considerations.
This comes at a time when the Central American and the Andes regions are experiencing a degree of instability unseen since the 1980’s and Chile, a regional stabilizer, is becoming increasingly ostracized because of its reluctance to follow perceived regional trends itself in regional affairs and by the tensions created by common geopolitical aspirations of its surrounding states. Bolivia and Peru aspire to regain territory lost to Chile during the War of the Pacific, and the issue has been exacerbated by the role of radical nationalism and by the involvement of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez in the dispute and the radical tone of his comments on the issue.
Venezuela- The immediate strategic crisis

Venezuela under the Chavez Presidency presents the challenge of a regional power with historic ambitions of Caribbean preponderance with an ideological foreign policy. Venezuela’s main source of influence is its ability to produce and deliver petroleum. Petroleum has enabled Venezuela to influence other states to conform to Venezuelan policies in exchange for favorable sales and shipment terms. The rising costs of Petroleum on the world market ensure that for the near future, Venezuela will enjoy substantial oil revenue, which could tempt into an effort to create a power shift in its favor in the region.

The increasing power disparity between a Venezuelan economy based on premium market energy prices as its foundation of its foreign policy and its quest for regional supremacy versus a comparatively politically and militarily weak region is only due to increase in the near term. The power disparity becomes even more apparent when coupled with Venezuelan domestic political and economic instability such as its inability of to control its borders. Its’ political, social and economic insecurity, the effects of which, due to its strategic position on the continent can spread into the Caribbean and the South American continent.

Ideologically, Venezuela has become assertively nationalistic and leaning toward the more radical elements of the developing world. Growing political implications of growing Venezuelan power as well as its simultaneous radicalization of its domestic politics and ambitions mean that Venezuela would be tempted to use its power to exploit Latin American insecurity and instability or impose its will in inter-hemispheric political contests in order to achieve domestic cohesion. The potentially damaging nature of Venezuelan efforts may make it impossible for the region to provide order and stability to regional social, economic and political change.

Evidence of this has already manifested itself. Over the last four years, the Venezuelan armed forces have undergone a significant modernization program. The most significant of these weapons purchases were made last year. The long rumored acquisition of up to approximately 50 of the latest production model MiG-29 (a few aircraft are already undergoing flight tests in Venezuela) will make the Venezuelan air force, already the largest and most powerful in the Caribbean in terms of operational combat aircraft, the most technologically advanced in Latin America. The purchase, including the most advanced air-to-air and anti-ship missiles, will enable Venezuela to project its power deep into the Caribbean and Northern South America.

The strategic implications and its challenges to the Dominican national interest of this purchase are serious. An insecure Colombia, a historic rival, will seek to redress the security imbalance and contribute to an arms buildup to match the Venezuelan one. Already, the Chavez administration has stymied the initial attempts by Colombia to redress the strategic military disparity when the Chavez Administration was able to convince the Zapatero government in Spain to rescind the sale of Spanish weapons systems agreed to under ex-President Jose Maria Aznar to Colombia.

Foreign policy and the DR’s national interest in Latin America Part 2 of 5

For the Dominican Republic, the long term political implications of growing Venezuelan power is detrimental to its interests as Venezuela will be tempted to use its power to exploit regional instability or impose its will in regional political contests. This could only make the strategic situation more unpredictable for the Dominican Republic, because of the possibility for Venezuelan miscalculation. The possibility exists that if Venezuela possessed more strategic military options than the surrounding region, the regional states, including the Dominican Republic could be forced into significant political concessions in the event of crises. An increasingly assertive Venezuela, actively seeking to overturn the status quo could miscalculate and provoke a showdown with the United States; the Dominican Republic will inevitably be on the front lines of such an event and would suffer the most consequences in such a confrontation.

The Dominican Republic must realize the implications of the Venezuelan military modernization program within the context of Venezuelan policy with all the elements of its actions put together. The potentially destabilizing policies of Venezuela will make it impossible for the region to provide order and stability for change. The Venezuelan arms modernization program in the context of its radical foreign policy could upend the regional military balance of power, increasing the potential for destabilizing crises.

Cuba-The Resurgent Power of The Caribbean

The need for the Dominican Republic to recognize the effect of the power disequilibrium in the Caribbean and create a conception of alternatives to address it is even more pressing with the formal declarations of the Cuban-Venezuelan defensive alliance by both President Hugo Chavez and President Fidel Castro during the first week of February of 2005.

Cuba has now come closer than at any time in the last 50 years to achieving its foreign policy goals. It has offset its loss of Soviet economic and political support with its policies of supporting the rise of favorable politicians and policies in the region to guarantee the security and stability of the Castro regime, its economic stability and to establish a coalition of Latin American powers to counter US interests in Latin America. The strategic goal of Cuban foreign policy is to build alliances with sympathetic governments and organizations while avoiding a final showdown with the United States in so doing.

The implications of Cuban foreign policy are serious for the Dominican Republic. The primary goal of ensuring the survival of the Cuban regime beyond Fidel Castro’s lifetime can only be accomplished by making the region accept the regime’s legitimacy. Since the regime desires absolute security, yet can no longer project its power in the region, the only way to accomplish this goal of absolute guarantee of survival is to facilitate the rise and support favorable governments and to manipulate the antagonisms of the region to its benefit, via congruence with the goals and elements of Venezuelan foreign policy.

Cuba presents the challenge of having historically projected military power to achieve its foreign policy goals. In the last 30 years, in addition to fomenting revolutionary movements, it has used military power to compel and deter other states and intimidate opponents in the region. Cuban air force aircraft attacked Bahamian government vessels and personnel in Bahamian waters in the 1980’s, and again used its air power to assert territorial claims in the Bahamas by over flying several cities in the country. The Dominican Republic itself became subject to the assertive projection of Cuban power in September of 1977, during “operacion pico”, the Cuban air force over flew and threatened to bomb Santo Domingo if a Cuban vessel that had been detained for violation Dominican territorial waters was not released. The last example took place in 1996, when the Cuban Air force shot down two unarmed private aircraft flown by Cuban exiles over international waters.
For the Dominican Republic, the danger of a neighbor seeking absolute security is obvious, not only because absolute security is impossible, but also because the quest for absolute security will mean absolute insecurity for other states in the region. The Cuban-Venezuelan de facto alliance thus presents challenges to the national interest of the Dominican Republic, as erratic opportunism by regional powers within the context of regional instability will pose an increasing threat to inter-American peace and stability.

Foundation for a new Dominican foreign policy- establishment of a strategic equilibrium
The Dominican Republic must recognize the strategic imperative for an alternative between Brazil and Venezuela’s regional ambitions and US ambiguity, indifference or isolation. A Caribbean bipolarization based on a US-Venezuelan tensions will affect the Dominican Republic more than any other Caribbean nation; the Eastern Caribbean states will increasingly retreat their former colonial protectors and possessors and Cuba will enjoy Venezuelan economic and political guarantees while the Dominican Republic, dependent on the current uncertain trends of US Latin American policy will be isolated and will have its regional influence foreclosed forcing it to abdicate its international goals. This would become the worst outcome; the solidification of factions, creating regional inflexibility while fomenting radicalism and instability in a region that needs to reduce instability for its progress.
The ultimate strategic goal for a Dominican foreign policy must be to elaborate and create consensus on regional principles for a regional equilibrium of power with the states of the Caribbean to create change and reforms within a structure of regional stability and to ensure economic development by attracting foreign investment in an era of intense competition that is favoring the Asian-Pacific rim at the expense of Latin American political and economic insecurity.
The only way to reduce regional instability created by the unleashing of regional ambitions and radicalism is to counterbalance the regional power disparities. The power disparity between the defacto Cuban Venezuelan arrangement and the Central American and the Caribbean region will only begin to be redressed by recognizing the disparity. The only way the Dominican Republic can become a regional power is to assert itself regionally to counterbalance Venezuelan influence and power. It is in the interests of the Dominican Republic to become a regional power in the Northern Caribbean. If the Dominican Republic is to become a regional power, it will possibly have to do so at the expense of Venezuela and Cuba. Yet, the issue should not become one of direct confrontation with Venezuela and Cuba. Stability must be created using the collective power of the states in the region to establish a strategic equilibrium, a regional balance of power to restrain Venezuelan and Cuban assertiveness and mitigate the consequences the Dominican Republic will encounter in a potential US-Venezuelan confrontation. The Dominican Republic must expand its freedom of action if it is to conduct a foreign policy based on its national interest in its effort to control its destiny.

Foreign policy and the DR’s national interest in Latin America Part 3 of 5

The Dominican Republic is ideally suited to become a regional leader in creating and maintaining the equilibrium. It is the largest sovereign democracy in the region, has the largest economy and military power outside of Cuba and Venezuela. It is also strategically located in the Caribbean between the United States and South America.

For the Dominican Republic to become a regional power, it must do so only with the approval of the democratic states in the Eastern Caribbean and Central American region. As a democratic country and with limited power, it will be dependent on legitimate support from other democracies in the region in any international arrangement; it must seek regional consensus on basic principles and issues, the basis for such a framework of a regional arrangement by coordinating its role with the other regional democratic countries.

The nature of regional Dominican Republic policy must have its foundation in security and collective regional interests to contain the effects of regional insecurity. A collective bargaining position in the Caribbean can offer a united front to Venezuelan efforts to link oil supply guarantees to political considerations to maintain regional freedom of action. The ability of the Dominican Republic to do so will determine if the Dominican Republic will be subject to a renewal of overt and direct assertion of Venezuelan power. If not, repetitions of the 2003 effort by the Venezuelan government to assert its power over the Dominican Republic when it halted all petroleum shipments to the Dominican Republic in an effort to force the Mejia Administration to extradite ex-Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Perez to Venezuela will be increasingly likely. The event demonstrated that the Dominican Republic’s economy and stability were subject not only to the influence of Venezuela, but also to the radically ideological and personalistic policies of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. Continuation of the refusal to consider this risk will condemn the Republic to having to make a decision between survival (Venezuelan oil supply guarantees) and prosperity and progress ( US free trade and economic aid agreements)

The Dominican Republic must recognize and seek to modify provisions of the Dominican Republic- Venezuelan energy supply accord just signed in late 2004 that stipulated that the financing for Venezuelan oil shipments must be made directly by the government of the Dominican Republic, after Venezuelan complaints that Dominican private companies that previously financed the purchases were supporting anti-Chavez elements. The direct linkage of the Dominican government to Venezuelan influence is a dangerous precedent, leading to more demands and increase the cost of non-alignment with Venezuelan policies.

Elaborating the Dominican national interest.

The increasing power disparity in the region means that the foreign policy priority of the Dominican Republic must be the creation and maintenance of a regional equilibrium. This means creating a new arrangement of states to counterbalance the assertively powerful states to create a more stable order of power in the region. Any attempt to establish a new power arrangement entails risk. However, the refusal to accept some risk would amount to giving the more powerful and assertive states in the region a blank check for regional rivals against the national interests of the Dominican Republic.

If the Dominican Republic is to facilitate its emergence as a regional power, a conception of the relationship between military power and diplomacy in Dominican foreign policy must reach consensus. To reach this consensus, the reality that the Republic’s resources are limited in relation to its challenges means that we must set priorities for Dominican foreign policy. These priorities must be defined by asking the following questions: What are the regional challenges the country faces? What are the goals of the Republic in the region and the world? Is it possible to foster a consensus that reconciles the principles and responsibilities as well as the Republic’s security and values? This has no historic precedent because traditionally, in the Dominican Republic, security and diplomacy have been treated as separate agendas. Yet, diplomacy is only effective and credible when it can employ both coercive and conciliatory instruments. History has demonstrated that weak countries cannot negotiate; they can only hope or submit. This is confirmation of a historical fact; the influence of nations has usually been proportionate to its military power.

A new Dominican Foreign policy must reorient the Armed Forces to reflect the strategic situation and the national interest of the Dominican Republic. The strategic failure of the Dominican Republic to confront Cuba’s Operacion Pico over the skies of Santo Domingo provides a historical axiom; credibility without power creates empty posturing. The establishment of the Dominican Republic as a regional power means that it must be a reliable ally, with the willingness and thus, credibility to use the instruments of power to make immediate and credible policies. The traditional Dominican inclination towards personalistic policies and time-consuming decision-making processes and a lack of confidence in the country’s political willingness to pursue its national interest facilitates tendencies toward eventual inaction. Inaction will inspire mistrust in potential allies, confidence in potential adversaries and will result in a loss of credibility and influence for the Dominican Republic in the region. If the Dominican Republic has no confidence in its ability to pursue its national interest, it cannot expect others to do so on its behalf.

The Dominican tradition of personalistic diplomacy, of individuals based on hopes of goodwill with hopes of reflecting individual relationships onto international politics is dangerous; Dominican foreign policy must be based on analyses and not on emotion. The national interest must be permanent and cannot be subordinated to the traditional personalistic policies of leaders or relationships of individuals. The Dominican Republic cannot risk its prospects for economic progress and security on the good will of individuals, it must be prepared to act against potential dangers, and the Dominican government must consider it a grave risk to permit a regional power to amass overwhelming strength vis a vis its neighbors. No statesman should entrust a country’s security on the personal trust of individuals on the belief that such a relationship will always prevail upon permanent national interests. A consensus on the concept of the country’s fundamental national interest will provide predictability and restraint in the area of foreign policy both domestically and internationally. Predictability is the element of international stability.

Another aspect of Dominican foreign policy that must be reconsidered in the current regional context is the nature of its foreign policy. The historic tendency of the Dominican foreign ministry has been to confuse diplomacy with foreign policy. They are not one and the same; diplomacy is a technique for promoting the national interest and is not an end in itself. The instruments of diplomacy are credible promises, credible threats and reliability. A diplomatic effort will be the center of gravity for the Dominican Republic to emerge as a regional power. The only way for the Dominican Republic to emerge as a regional power is to demonstrate the capacity for regional leadership. The best way to exercise leadership is to demonstrate it with the purpose of conveying credibility through resolve.

Foreign policy and the DR’s national interest in Latin America Part 4 of 5

The national interest of the Dominican Republic and the focus of its foreign policy should also include the goal of reducing regional crises. The continuing tradition of inter-hemispheric political crises is a dangerous occurrence. If crises no longer produced fear of escalation to all out war, they will become more frequent. A crisis evaded will only be an interregnum for a new crisis. Yet, the leaders of the Dominican Republic must accept that the main instruments for resolving crises will often depend on the willingness of states to use their power to limit them when they develop and enforce settlements. Peace between the states in the region will not be ensured by legal documents by international organizations such as the Organization of American States (OAS) alone but by a stable distribution of relative power. The Dominican Republic should realize that to pursue the national interest depends less on interpretations of legal agreements than on its perception of its national interest. This was demonstrated most recently by Chavez’s cutoff of oil shipments to the Dominican Republic during the Carlos Andres Perez crisis.

The regional ambitions of Venezuela and the aspirations of Brazil for regional predominance indicate that other powers that seek non-alignment and divergent policies against these powers could be ostracized laying the foundations for regional polarization. The danger of a Central America and Andean region included in a multilateral US free-trade agreement and a Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela determined to assert themselves within the region carries the danger of regional blocs and the polarization of Latin America making instability more likely. The solidification of regional blocs will contribute to regional inflexibility and radicalism, which could make inter-regional conflict fed by regional antagonisms more likely.

Conclusions

The immediate national interest in the creation of the regional equilibrium is to provide an alternative in the Caribbean region from Venezuelan/ Cuban assertiveness and US isolation or indifference. The Dominican Republic, only after deciding on the nature of the relationship between its foreign policy and military strategy must seek to engage the Eastern Caribbean states within a security and political framework to create a unified regional arrangement to counterbalance Cuban -Venezuelan ambitions and to combine the limited political, economic and military resources of the region to limit costs, share burdens, and enhance the region’s influence in world affairs.

The Dominican Republic’s security has become strategically interdependent with the security of Central and South America along with the Caribbean. I believe that the Dominican Republic’s geopolitical position would be enhanced by a strategic relationship with the regional powers, not isolation from or acquiescence to them. To facilitate this however, the Dominican Republic must create a regional arrangement that would be composed of states willing to promote stability and security. While the Dominican Republic must attempt to set the regional agenda to reflect its interests, it must respect the different cultural and historical values and political beliefs of the states of the region, while enhancing the independence, security and prosperity it.

To accomplish the goal of regional stability and the regional equilibrium, I believe the Dominican Republic’s national interest demand the focus of its foreign policy priorities in the following areas:

1. Focus on arms control and regional restraint. The military balance is in a state of disequilibrium. This could create opportunities for larger military powers to force smaller powers into making concessions, increasing instability and the risk of miscalculation.

2. The relationship with Venezuela must not become antagonistic or stalemated. A strategy of containment will fail, as the region will be unable to reach consensus on what could be considered aggression and the methods to confront it. Some states will even be tempted to evade the problem by refusing to acknowledge the crises. Regional insecurity would only increase if Venezuela perceived that the goal of a regional power or a security arrangement was to intervene directly in domestic Venezuelan affairs, further radicalizing the Venezuelan government and creating more instability rather than regional equilibrium. A stalemated relationship can become antagonistic as well. Venezuela, due to the premium petroleum market prices on the global market can outspend any regional rival in an arms race should interregional relations become factionalized. In the interest of regional stability, a regulated relationship of cooperation and competition with Venezuela is necessary. The Dominican Republic must not be lulled into any strategy that has an objective of isolation Venezuela, it will only produce inaction and reduce the Republic’s freedom of action and consign the country to being on the front line of any confrontation involving Venezuela.

3. The establishment of bilateral and multilateral security arrangements. The OAS has demonstrated that it will not be able to create collective regional stability. The history of hemispheric collective action has demonstrated that it has been easier to obtain agreement on inaction than on commitment. Historically even when there has been consensus on the recognition of aggression, it has been difficult to achieve a common consensus as to what actions should be taken. A sub regional bilateral and multilateral security framework, not formal collective security organizations more effectively able to both convey the interests of the states in the region and the willingness to assert the interests of its members. The peace and security of the region will be best guaranteed by the creation of a strategic equilibrium, a multilateral effort that will counterbalance the ambitions of any power or combination of powers to seek regional hegemony.

4. Enhance the Dominican geopolitical position by facilitating a strategic engagement with Chile, Mexico and the Central American states. The Dominican Republic should focus on promoting, but not participating in, the reestablishment of sovereignty and the rule of law in Central America and Colombia, the strategic pivot of the Arc of Instability in the Andes. The defeat or neutralization of the narco insurgency and the paramilitaries in Colombia at the earliest possible time will facilitate the elimination of the effects of narco-terrorism, the single greatest source of hemispheric instability. It would also facilitate the establishment of a regional power capable of counterbalancing Venezuelan ambitions, reinforcing the regional equilibrium. Mexico’s interest in a stable regional petroleum market and its desires for regional leadership will contribute significantly to the establishment of security facilitated by the creation of a regional equilibrium

Foreign policy and the DR’s national interest in Latin America Part 5 of 5

5. The Dominican Armed Forces should be restructured and modernized to reflect the strategic relationship between diplomacy and power in Dominican foreign policy. The Dominican armed forces must change their strategic policy from internal security to an orientation towards projection of Dominican national interests. A Dominican military with the ability to project Dominican power and influence for its national interests within the region will contribute significantly to achieving regional influence and advancing the national interest of the Dominican Republic. Military power should not be considered the only element of national power; it is but one factor in the assessments countries make when comparing relative power when calculating foreign policy.

6. The Dominican Republic must emphasize the dangers of criminal and terrorist organizations present in countries with the tacit approval of leaders or in non-governable territory within many states. Countries that harbor destabilizing elements such as guerillas and criminal elements face great dangers. These organizations can create events domestically outside the government’s ability to control them; the decisions of war and peace will be out of the control of the national government. If these elements grow sufficiently powerful, they will inevitably attempt to replace the authority of the host government. History has shown that the weakness of states, rather than their strength has led to external intervention

7. The frequent domestic upheavals of the Haitian state will be the ultimate strategic challenge for the security and stability of the Dominican Republic. Due to the dangers presented by number six above, the Dominican Republic must continue to bring attention to the global community the situation in Haiti and must support the efforts of the UN mission to bring order and stability in that country. Simultaneously, the focus of the Dominican army should be the security of the Dominican border with Haiti, currently the scene of terrorist and criminal threats to Dominican interests such as Jean Robert and other criminal activity.

8. Promote the stability and effective governance of the states in the region. The internal instability of many of the states of Central America and the Andes region could be exploited by radical, narco-insurgent, terrorist elements and regional rivals which would contribute to regional radicalism and crises, making inter-regional conflict fed by regional antagonisms increasingly likely.
The Dominican Republic’s capacity to recognize the region’s power shift and the implications of it is essential. It is in the national interests of the Dominican Republic to promote, establish and maintain a new order in the Caribbean to balance the increasing power disparity between a radicalizing Venezuela, a resurgent Cuba, the historically isolationist Mexico and the Eastern Caribbean states and the hemispheric ambitions of Brazil and the instability that is prevalent in the region from the Arc of Instability to Central America. The ability of the Dominican Republic to facilitate such an order within a destabilized region susceptible to radicalism and crises is crucial to the security of the Dominican Republic. The national interest of the Dominican Republic should be to facilitate the conditions for stability in a region already losing influence in world affairs and losing the ability to attract foreign investment due to the chronic instability of the region. The national security of the Dominican Republic is dependent upon its leaders to do so.

The Dominican Republic must avoid its historic tendency of using the distance of the Caribbean and its self-perception as an insignificant actor in regional affairs as a justification for inaction and isolation from regional affairs. When modern weapons systems, organized crime and narco terrorism can span oceans, its security and stability is linked to regional peace. When the Dominican Republic’s agricultural, manufacturing and financial interests are affected by decisions made in foreign countries; its prosperity will be linked to regional prosperity. The stability and security of the region and its prospects for socio-economic development are indivisible. Its political, social and economic security and stability means that the national interest of the Dominican Republic must include the security and stability of the region.
________
The author is Chairman of The Aegis Group, a Miami; Florida based economic, investment, political and security/ defense consultancy firm.

Author:
Fred A. Quintana

Well first of all thanks CFranco for bringing something different to the board, something certainly important to DR. Unfortunately I have some criticisms of the article.


The main thrust of the author seems to be that DR leadership needs to pull away from 'legalism' and procedural diplomacy and turn more towards naked power politics. However following his valid explanation of why this is the case, his action points are mostly procedural diplomacy. In the whole of the article only in action point 5 is the author explicit about what he is calling for; reorientation and modernization of the armed forces. Other suggested action points, like bilateral security agreements, condemnation of non-state forces, and promoting stable governments, are all just more of the type of slow, political, personalized decision making that the author rightfully condemns. Point 4 is the only other direct suggestion that is not of that type, as he picks out two states for DR to ally with closely.

I can see this vision working out, but much depends on how the re-orientation of the military is carried out. Buying foreign armaments seems like a dubious proposition; it could bring us closer to the major power we buy from, but could also be a major boondoggle and waste of cash. On the other hand the professional militarization of more individuals results in we know what amongst us Dominicans (dictatorship) so that is another thing to bear in mind should DR decide to pursue this path of realpolitik loosely outlined above.

There are of course certain flaws... However, It does sounds like the Dominican Republic I'd like to live in... Id advice anyone to read Thucydides History of the Pelopennesian War... and read about the "Melian dialogue" and "Athens rise to power"

I believe and this is my own contribution to the proposed road for DR, that DR adopts a weopons indigenous program so that we may sasified our local consumption of military hardware instead of spending lots of money on minor things that we can produce. Also if we are to buy high tech weaponry from a foreign country that country must have no interest what so ever in the caribbean... Why...here's why.... Lets use venezuelas example... They have F-16 from the US.... the US the only likely country to attack venezuela would not sell venezuela weapons because they disagree in the mere political crap... Imagen if a real war were to break out... Who would supply what the F-16 needs in order to be operational....

here's a list of country who should not be supply DR, why, these are our neighbors and potential rivals.

US
Mexico
Venezuela
Colombia
France
Britain
Cuba
Russia (because of their ties to Cuba)

here's a list of strong countries with little involvement in the Caribbean

Brazil
The Neatherlands
Germany
Easter European countries
Asian countries (Japan, India, Korea del Sur)
Middle Eastern countries (Egypt, Turkey, Iran)

Is it TOOOOOOOOOOOO LONNNNNGGGGGGGGG.... LOL

Hello,

Just as a baseline I looked up The Aegis Group
in the U.S.Senate: Legislation & Records Home>
Lobbying Disclosures.

http://cache.search.yahoo-ht2.akadns.net/search/cache?ei=UTF-8&p=%22The+Aegis+Group%22The+%22american+trade+coalition%22&y=Search&fr=moz2&u=www.senate.gov/pagelayout/legislative/b_three_sections_with_teasers/clientlist_page_T_V.htm&w=%22the+aegis+group%22+%22american+trade+coalition%22&d=AyUGoZzfQ9K0&icp=1&.intl=us

The Aegis Group is listed as a lobbyist for three clients,
one of which is the American Trade Coalition.

Is this on behalf of the American Trade Coalition or another
client? If another who?

Just asking the origin of the presentation.
It is helpful in background.

Post deleted (double post).